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CRIMES IN NATIONAL COURTS: 
LOOKING BACK ON 2009 IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
David Schwendiman* † 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 This article grew out of the Atrocity Crimes Litigation Year-
in-Review (2009) Conference convened by the Center for 
International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of 
Law on February 4, 2010. The objective of the Conference was to 
analyze whether and how various tribunals and courts dealing with 
atrocity crimes advanced international criminal and humanitarian 
law during 2009. What follows is a look back on a significant year 
                                                            
* The author is an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Utah. He 
served as an international prosecutor in the Special Department for War Crimes of 
the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 2006 to December 
2009. From November 2007 to December 2009, he was Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
and Head of the Special Department for War Crimes. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the author, for which he alone is responsible. They do not 
reflect nor represent the views of the United States Department of Justice, the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, or the Prosecutor’s Office 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
† I am grateful to my national colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina for accepting 
me and giving me the opportunity to lead them for a time as the Head of the 
Special Department for War Crimes. A more committed, professional, and 
courageous group of prosecutors would be hard to find anywhere in any 
prosecution service. They are not often well served by their national government 
and the institutions in which they work, but they persist and they get the job done 
in spite of it all. I admire and respect them. My comments are meant especially for 
the prosecutors in the Special Department for War Crimes and the judges in the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prosecutors and judges in the Cantons and 
Districts who have already caught the vision of what needs to be done to make a 
meaningful difference in dealing with the nation’s war crimes predicament. My 
hope is that they will take what I write seriously, use it, adapt it, or reject it in 
favor of something better, but not simply ignore it. 
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in the life of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(State Prosecutor’s Office) and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(State Court).  
¶2 National investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes 
are becoming increasingly important because of the imminent 
closure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR)1 and the inherent limitations of the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction.2 As a result, war crimes 
prosecutions in national courts, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
will have a greater impact on the development of international 
criminal and humanitarian law than ever before. However, the risks 
to the development of the law will also be greater. For these reasons, 
it is appropriate to examine some of the more significant 
developments in atrocity crime litigation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
over the last few years. These developments include responses to 
important issues that directly relate to the enforcement of 
international criminal and humanitarian law in a national jurisdiction 
and that have potential for affecting the overall development of 
international criminal and humanitarian law. 
¶3 In 2007, the State Prosecutor’s Office, specifically the 
Special Department for War Crimes (Special Department), which 
manages the investigation and prosecution of war crimes at the 
national level, and the State Court began making necessary and 
significant advances in war crimes case selection and prioritization, 
charging, plea-bargaining, and in managing the forensic aspects of 
locating, recovering, examining, and identifying mortal remains 
from the war. Unfortunately, developments in the Prosecutor’s 
Office since the end of 2009 are jeopardizing past advances in the 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes cases. This is the result 
of the failure in 2009 of the national government, the international 
community, and certain international organizations to take 
responsibility to develop international criminal and humanitarian 
law and the institutions that apply that law in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina more seriously. The national government in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not genuinely committed to supporting the work of 
the State Court or the State Prosecutor’s Office. Without consistent 
                                                            
1 See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).  
2 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, Jul. 1, 2002, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].  
2010] D A V I D  S C H W E N D I M A N 
 
271
international encouragement and support and, more importantly, 
without consistent political and financial support from the national 
government, the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office have 
little chance of surviving, let alone succeeding. The advances in 
atrocity crime jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have 
occurred since 2007 are in jeopardy of being lost. If they are lost, 
atrocity crime jurisprudence and practice elsewhere will be affected. 
¶4 While a number of verdicts and opinions rendered in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in war crimes cases over the past four years have 
made important contributions to the development of the country’s 
war crimes jurisprudence,3 this article is mostly a review of policy 
and structural developments in the Prosecutor’s Office’s Special 
Department for War Crimes since 2008. The main advances 
included installing policies to better utilize the resources available 
for investigating and prosecuting war crimes and ensuring that the 
                                                            
3 From 2005 through March 2010, Section I of the State Court, which has 
jurisdiction over war crimes cases, reported sixty-three First Instance verdicts and 
thirty-eight Second Instance verdicts. A number of First Instance verdicts and 
appellate rulings in 2008 and 2009 made important contributions to the 
development of the war crimes jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 
case of Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnai and Herzegovina v. Miloš Stupar, et al., 
Case No. X-KR-05/24, (Jul. 29, 2008), a trial panel returned a First Instance 
verdict in 2008 convicting six of the original eleven men charged with genocide in 
connection with the murder of over 1,000 Bosniak (Muslim) men in the 
warehouse of the Kravica Farming Cooperative in July 1995. This was the first 
national genocide verdict rendered by the State Court. Miloš Stupar was 
subsequently acquitted by a dubious appellate court ruling in 2009, but the 
sentences and convictions of the remaining parties in the case were upheld on 
appeal. In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Milorad Trbić, Case 
No. X-KR-07/386, (Oct. 16, 2009), another case where the accused was found 
guilty of genocide, the State Court made important findings in 2009 regarding the 
application of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide. 
In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Marko Radić et. al., Case 
No. X-KR-05/139, (May 14, 2008), a crimes against humanity case, the State 
Court made important findings in 2009 regarding command responsibility and 
joint criminal enterprise forms of liability. In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Paško Ljubičić, Case No. X-KR-06/241, (Apr. 29, 2008), 
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herezegovina v. Dušan Fuštar, Case No. X-
KR-06/200-1 (Apr. 21, 2008), and Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Damir Ivanković, Case No. X-KR-08/549-1 (Jul. 2, 2009), the State Court 
accepted pleas of guilty entered by the accused in exchange for the prosecutor’s 
recommendations regarding sentences. The Ljubičić and Ivanković pleas were 
partially predicated on their promise to assist in pending and future investigations. 
Both provided important assistance in pending matters, including help locating 
and recovering mortal remains. 
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human rights standards developed by the Special Department for 
War Crimes guided its work. These important developments are 
now in jeopardy and deserve the immediate attention of the 
international community and the national government to preserve 
them. 
II. BACKGROUND 
¶5 The 1992 to 1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
“Bosnian War”) occurred as a consequence and part of the breakup 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which began in the 
late 1980s. In January 1991, Slovenia successfully split from 
Yugoslavia following a referendum on independence and a near 
bloodless ten-day war. Next, Croatia separated from Yugoslavia and 
fought a “war of independence,” that lasted from January 1992 to 
November 1995. In October 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared 
its sovereignty.  
¶6 Following the October declaration, tensions rose between the 
Muslim, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Serb constituent peoples in the 
newly formed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1992, Bosnian-Serb 
forces besieged Sarajevo and hostilities began throughout Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.4 The fighting officially ended on November 21, 
1995, after the parties to the conflict met in Dayton, Ohio and 
agreed to the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords).5 As a result of the 
fighting, 2.2 million people were displaced and an estimated 97,214 
people, including 39,685 civilians, were killed.6 
¶7 Among other things, the Dayton Accords, which were 
concluded in Paris in December 1995, placed Bosnia and 
                                                            
4 See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (Penguin 
Books 1995) (1996); SABRINA P. RAMET, THE THREE YUGOSLAVIAS: STATE-
BUILDING AND LEGITIMATION, 1918-2005 341- 469 (Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press 2006). 
5 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
(Dayton Peace Agreement), Nov. 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170 [hereinafter Dayton 
Accords]; see also, RICHARD HOLBROKE, TO END A WAR, (Modern Library rev. 
ed. 1999). 
6 See Research and Documentation Centre, Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment 
of the Database, (June 17, 2007) (finding that of the 39,685 civilians who were 
killed by hostile action during the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 33,071 or 
approximately 83% were Bosniaks (Muslims), 4,075 or 10% were Serbs, 2,163 or 
6% were Croats, and 376 or approximately 1% were of other backgrounds). 
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Herzegovina under international oversight in the form of a High 
Representative who was given extraordinary powers to ensure that 
the Dayton Accords were fully implemented.7 A Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) made up of representatives of the 
international community was formed to advise the High 
Representative. The goal of the Dayton Accords and international 
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to develop and strengthen 
government institutions, including the courts and prosecutors, and 
promote economic development so that full ownership and 
responsibility for governance can be given over to national and local 
authorities. This goal has not yet been met. 
¶8 In many ways, although the Dayton Accords stopped the 
shooting, the war never truly ended. The conflict continues to affect 
and influence political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and remains 
just beneath the surface of public consciousness. It emerges in how 
states in the region use war crime allegations for political advantage 
and in how atrocity crimes are dealt with in the national criminal 
justice systems. Each state in the Balkans has addressed war crimes 
stemming from the 1992-1995 conflict with varying degrees of 
success and credibility. Of the states in the region, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is saddled with the greatest challenges and war crimes 
workload simply because the war was fought mostly within its 
borders and, as a result, it suffered the most human losses and the 
greatest property damage. 
¶9 In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve long-term 
political stability and economic development, it must properly deal 
with atrocity crimes committed during the Bosnian War. As an 
incentive to make this happen, the PIC required that national 
authorities entrench the rule of law in part through the adoption of a 
                                                            
7 See Peace Implementation Council Bonn Conclusions, art. XI. ¶ 2b (Dec. 10, 
1997), available at: http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 (The 
High Representative is designated to oversee implementation of the civilian 
aspects of the Dayton Accords. The High Representative was given extraordinary 
powers (“Bonn Powers”) in December 1997 at the Peace Implementation Council 
Conference in Bonn, including the power to “use his final authority in theatre 
regarding interpretation of the Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the 
Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making 
binding decisions, as he judges necessary,” on, among other things, “interim 
measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will 
remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a 
decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned.” Bonn 
Conclusions, XI. High Representative, ¶ 11). 
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national war crimes strategy.8 This requirement was partially met, at 
least on paper, when the Council of Ministers adopted the National 
War Crimes Strategy in December 2008.9 While the National War 
Crimes Strategy was viewed as a political accomplishment, 
practically speaking it is weak and will do little that is meaningful to 
address Bosnia and Herzegovina’s war crimes predicament either in 
the short or the long term. This is because it relies on a number of 
baseless assumptions: that the number of war crimes “cases” is 
known or determinable with precision; that the number of hardcopy 
war crimes related files held by the prosecutors throughout Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is a reliable measure for predicting either the 
workload or required resources; or, finally, that the “most complex 
and top priority” cases can all be resolved in seven years and the rest 
in fifteen years. The War Crimes Strategy also makes a fundamental 
strategic mistake by requiring Cantonal (Bosnian-Croat Federation) 
and District (Republika Srpska) prosecutors and courts, despite their 
express concerns and reasonable reservations,10 to manage the bulk 
of the war crimes workload. Responsibility for war crimes 
                                                            
8 See Peace Implementation Council, Declaration by the Steering Board of the 
Peace Implementation Council, 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2008) (stating that prior to 
transition, Bosnia and Herzegovina must entrench the rule of law as demonstrated 
through the adoption of a national war crimes strategy, passage of a law on aliens 
and asylum, and the adoption of a national justice sector reform strategy).  
9 The author of this article was a member of the Working Group that had the task 
of creating the National War Crimes Strategy. Aside from the Chief Prosecutor, 
who served as Chair of the Working Group, the author was the only working war 
crimes prosecutor on the Working Group. During deliberations on the draft War 
Crimes Strategy document, the author expressed disagreement with the way in 
which the process was being managed and how it was being influenced by 
individuals who were seemingly interested only in satisfying the PIC requirement 
and not writing a strategy with long-term value. The author gave the Chair written 
objections to the substance of the proposed War Crimes Strategy when it became 
apparent that the proposed strategy was incomplete and unworkable in practice. In 
the end, the author abstained from voting on the final strategy. It is the author’s 
view that the December 2008 National War Crimes Strategy fails in significant 
ways to meet the spirit of the Rule of Law objective set out by the PIC. Its value 
came mostly in forcing the national government and the international community 
to seriously consider the future of war crimes investigations and prosecutions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and begin to plan concretely to deal with that future. In 
the end it simply fell short. 
10 See Richard S. Gebelein, Solving War Crimes Cases in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Report on the Capacities of Courts and Prosecutor Offices’ within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Investigate, Prosecute and Try War Crimes Cases 
(2008). 
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investigations and prosecutions should have been centralized at the 
national level in the State Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court 
instead of diluting scarce resources by trying to create the capacity 
to investigate and prosecute war crimes in every Canton and 
District. This singular weakness will make the implementation of 
the National War Crimes Strategy problematic for years. 
¶10 In addition to the requirement imposed by the PIC, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has no choice but to properly address war crimes, 
as onerous as its obligation may be, because there are many people 
who are still deeply affected by what happened to them emotionally, 
physically, economically, religiously, socially, and politically. The 
national government has shown little will to meaningfully deal with 
the consequences of war crimes, but victims’ demand for 
government action will not subside. The failure to deal with this 
effectively frustrates survivors’ commitment to the state and is one 
of the reasons why so many leave the country when they can or have 
plans to leave in the event of renewed hostilities.11 
¶11 If war crimes are not addressed in a meaningful way, 
political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue and 
tension will persist between the sides that still battle one another 
socially and politically. Until a sufficient level of accountability has 
been reached to satisfy its legal obligations, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
must continue to investigate, prosecute, and punish those 
responsible for atrocity during the conflict, provide the victims and 
survivors with meaningful redress, and establish enough of a reliable 
record, arrived at through a process that is legitimate and credible, to 
prevent the history of the conflict from being manipulated and 
exploited for political advantage by any side. If it fails to do this, 
atrocities committed during the war will continue to frustrate the 
nation’s ability to provide its citizens better lives and more 
opportunity.  
III. THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
¶12 The period between the end of the fighting in 1995 and the 
beginning of justice sector reform in 2000 saw relatively few war 
crimes prosecuted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was principally 
because the ICTY Rules of the Road process throttled local 
                                                            
11 See United Nations Development Programme: Bosnia Herzegovina, The Silent 
Majority Speaks (2007). 
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prosecutions. With the creation of the State Court in 200012 by then-
High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch and the State Prosecutor’s 
Office in 200213 by then-High Representative Paddy Ashdown, a 
state level infrastructure began to develop that promised to be able 
to eventually support national prosecution of war crimes cases in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The State Court and the State Prosecutor’s 
Office are national institutions with statewide jurisdiction over war 
crimes14 committed during the Bosnian War.15 The State Prosecutor 
is independent of the State Court.16 The State Court and State 
Prosecutor’s Office share jurisdiction in war crimes cases with the 
Cantonal and District courts and prosecutors, a confusing situation 
that was further complicated by the National War Crimes Strategy.  
¶13 In 2003, following the creation of the State Court and State 
Prosecutor’s Office, High Representative Ashdown proposed a 
number of criminal justice reforms that were adopted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly. One change was the rewriting of Chapter 
17 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina to include war 
crimes provisions that were consistent with the ICTY Statute and, 
for the most part, were modeled on the ICC (Rome) Statute. These 
provisions were necessary before the ICTY could begin under Rule 
11bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to return 
indicted cases that it could not complete to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for trial. Without such substantive changes to the criminal code, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to prosecute war crimes according 
to existing and developing international criminal and humanitarian 
law was questionable. The reforms also implemented a common-
law-like, adversarial system of criminal justice.  
                                                            
12 Office of the High Representative, Decision Establishing the BiH State Court 
(Nov. 12, 2000). 
13 Office of the High Representative, Decision Enacting the Law on the 
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Aug. 6, 2002). 
14 War crimes, as the phrase is used in this article, includes genocide, crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of 
the law of armed conflict. The State Prosecutor and the State Court have 
jurisdiction over war crimes. See CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., ch. 17 (2003).  
15 The State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office also have certain general 
crime responsibilities related to tax, customs, and terrorism cases and specific 
responsibility for organized crime, economic crime, and corruption cases. See 
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,Official Gazette of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 16/02, art. 13 (2004). See also id. art. 12. 
16 Id. art. 2. 
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¶14 Under new Criminal Procedure Code provisions, also 
adopted in 2003, only the prosecutor in Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
initiate and conduct criminal proceedings, a term that includes 
criminal investigations.17 An investigation begins when the 
prosecutor issues an investigative order after finding “grounds for 
suspicion” that a crime has been committed.18 On the national level, 
once the State Prosecutor is satisfied that there is “enough evidence 
for grounded suspicion” that crimes over which the State Court has 
jurisdiction was committed, he prepares and proposes an indictment 
listing the person or persons accused to the Court for confirmation.19 
¶15 Indictments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are complicated 
matters of form and substance. Article 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code describes in detail the requirements of an 
indictment proposed for confirmation by the State Court. Every 
indictment includes extensive lists of proposed witnesses and 
evidence, a lengthy recitation of the factual allegations in support of 
the charges, and a detailed summary of the results of the 
investigation that led to the indictment. Indictments are much more 
than mere notice pleadings like those commonly used in most 
adversarial jurisdictions, including the ICTY.20 Since war crimes 
practice began in earnest at the state level in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2005, the State Court has been relatively strict about 
holding prosecutors to the use of evidence and witnesses listed in the 
indictment, and proof of the allegations made in support of the 
counts charged in the indictment.  
¶16 A preliminary hearing judge in the State Court will confirm 
an indictment submitted by the prosecutor if, after examining each 
count along with the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, he 
                                                            
17 CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 1, 16. 
18 Id. arts. 17, 216, 35(2)(a), “[A]s soon as he becomes aware that there are 
grounds for suspicion that a criminal offense has been committed, [the prosecutor 
has the right and duty] to take necessary steps to discover it and investigate it, to 
identify the suspect(s), to guide and supervise the investigation, as well as direct 
the activities of authorized officials pertaining to the identification of suspect(s) 
and the gathering of information and evidence.”  
19 Id. art. 226.  
20 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 47(c): “The indictment shall set 
forth the name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts 
of the case and of the crime with which the suspect is charged.” An indictment is 
reviewed by the Trial Chamber to determine whether a prima facie case has been 
established before it is confirmed; Statute of the International Tribunal of the 
ICTY art. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
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determines that the Court has jurisdiction, concludes that the 
indictment meets the formal requirements of Article 227, satisfies 
himself that the statute of limitations has not run, amnesty has not 
been granted the accused, or whether “some other obstacles preclude 
prosecution,” and is convinced that “grounded suspicion” exists.21 
These determinations are made on the information contained in the 
indictment and in the accompanying documentation supplied by the 
prosecutor. Although not entirely clear from the decisions of the 
State Court, the standard used by the preliminary hearing judge 
appears to be whether the submitted materials establish a prima facie 
case. 
¶17 In 2004, special divisions were created within the State 
Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office to handle war crimes 
cases.22 Section I of the State Court, also known as the War Crimes 
Chamber, has jurisdiction over Chapter 17 war crimes that were 
committed during the Bosnian War.23 First Instance trials in Section 
I are conducted before a three judge panel. During proceedings, the 
accused is presumed innocent24 and is entitled to present a defense.25 
The prosecutor has the burden of proving the guilt of an accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Verdicts in First Instance trials can be 
appealed to the Appellate Division of Section I, which conducts 
Second Instance proceedings and issues final and binding verdicts.26 
Some matters related to issues raised in war crimes cases can also be 
taken to the Constitutional Court, which has prescribed jurisdiction 
to render opinions on issues referred to it by any court concerning 
whether a law, “on whose validity its decision depends,” is 
compatible with the constitution, the European Convention on 
Human Rights or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina.27  
¶18 The Special Department for War Crimes (Special 
Department) in the State Prosecutor’s Office was created in 2004 to 
investigate and prosecute Chapter 17 war crimes that were 
                                                            
21 CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 228. 
22 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 24; Law on 
the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, arts. 3, 12. 
23 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 13. 
24 CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 3. 
25 Id. art. 7. 
26 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 26. 
27 The Constitutional Court also has jurisdiction over disputes between the 
political entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are referred to it by the executive 
or the Parliamentary Assembly. See BOSN. & HERZ CON. art. VI; Dayton Accords, 
supra note 5, Annex 5. 
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committed during the war.28 Prosecutors in the Special Department 
initiate war crimes investigations,29 authorize arrests,30 prepare and 
propose indictments to the State Court for confirmation,31 and 
present evidence in support of confirmed indictments in proceedings 
before Section I.32 Special Department prosecutors also represent the 
government in appeals before the Section I Appellate Division.33 
¶19 Beginning in late 2004, international prosecutors were 
permitted to practice in the Special Department for War Crimes.34 
International prosecutors have the same responsibilities, authority, 
and are subject to the same rules as national prosecutors. They 
investigate and prosecute war crimes alongside their national 
colleagues with full authority and privileges of audience in the State 
Court.35 This unique situation allows international prosecutors to 
have a direct hand in the enforcement, application, and interpretation 
                                                            
28 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, arts. 3, 12.  
29 CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 35, 216. 
30 Id. arts. 123, 131-147. 
31 Id. arts. 35, 226-228. 
32 Id. arts. 35, 260, 261, 277. 
33 Id. arts. 35, 293. 
34 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 18(1); 
Agreement Between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Registry for Section I for War Crimes and Section 
II for Organised Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and 
Appellate Divisions of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Special 
Department for War Crimes and the Special Department for Organized Crime, 
Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as on the Creation of the Transition Council, Replacing the 
Registry Agreement of 1 December 2004 and the Annex Thereto, Official Gazette 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina-International Agreements 3/07, art. 8 (2007). See also, 
Book of Rules on the Procedure for the Selection and Appointment of 
International Judges and Prosecutors, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, 
Nov. 10, 2006. The Registrar for the Special Department for War Crimes, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the High Representative agreed in 2005 that six 
international prosecutors would work in the Special Department for War Crimes. 
The 2006 revised Registry Agreement contemplated that the number of 
international prosecutors would gradually decrease over a transitional period until 
at the end of 2009 no international prosecutors would handle war crimes cases. It 
became clear early in 2008, however, that the need for continued involvement of 
international prosecutors in the Special Department would not end as early as 
predicted by the Registry Agreement, but the international community was 
reluctant and slow to instruct the Registry to seek the changes and make the 
adjustments needed to keep international prosecutors involved beyond 2009.  
35 See Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 18(1). 
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of international criminal and humanitarian law in war crimes cases 
at the national level.  
¶20 In addition to international prosecutors who were practicing 
in Section I, in 2004 international judges began sitting on Section I 
trial panels and appellate panels.36 The original intent of this 
extraordinary arrangement was to allow international judges and 
prosecutors to participate directly in war crimes trials and appeals 
for a “transition” period of no more than five years, an arbitrary 
deadline that ended on December 14, 2009. The High 
Representative exercised his extraordinary powers in December 
2009 and extended the mandate of a number of international 
prosecutors for an additional three years.37 However, the High 
Representative did not extend the mandate of Section I international 
judges beyond what was required to complete cases in progress.38  
¶21 The High Representative’s delay in extending international 
prosecutor’s mandates until the eve of expiration resulted in the loss 
of all but one experienced international prosecutor. Many 
international staff members in the Special Department for War 
Crimes found it necessary to leave as a consequence. This is a 
serious setback for ongoing cases and future investigations and 
prosecutions because it means the loss of experts on the use of 
international criminal and humanitarian law in the national criminal 
justice system. The true impact of the loss of international 
prosecutors may never be known, but it will certainly be felt as cases 
that were under investigation by international prosecutors begin to 
stall and as the Special Department attempts to find temporary 
replacements to cover cases in trial or to stretch already thin 
resources to meet critical emergencies.  
¶22 The government recently authorized new national 
prosecutors for the Special Department and the High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council, an independent national body that selects and 
oversees all prosecutors and judges working in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, to chose three new international prosecutors who were 
                                                            
36 Id. art. 65.  
37 See Office of the High Representative [OHR], Decision Enacting the Law on 
Amendments to the Law on Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR 
Doc. 19/09 (Dec. 14, 2009). The High Representative’s did not extend the mission 
of international prosecutors working in the State Prosecutor’s Office’s Special 
Department for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption.   
38 See Office of the High Representative [OHR], Decision Enacting the Law on 
Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR Doc. 18/09 
(Dec. 14, 2009). 
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to begin working in the Special Department for War Crimes in the 
second quarter of 2010. Only two had accepted positions by the 
beginning of July 2010. However, it will be some time before the 
new national and international prosecutors are able to make up for 
the loss of knowledge, skill, and experience that resulted from the 
High Representative’s and the national government’s failure to 
extend the international prosecutors’ mandates before December 
2009. The poor handling of this issue by the national government, 
the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and the High 
Representative illustrates the precarious position in which the 
development of international criminal and humanitarian law finds 
itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
¶23 Continued involvement of international prosecutors and 
judges in war crimes investigations and prosecutions is necessary to 
ensure that international criminal and humanitarian law is developed 
and applied properly by national institutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. If this does not occur, what the ICTY began fifteen 
years ago will be in serious jeopardy of becoming a relic when the 
ICTY closes, as is expected, in less than two years. It is too early to 
know whether there is a reliable way to gauge when international 
involvement should end, and the High Representative was unwise to 
set another arbitrary deadline for ending international prosecutors’ 
participation in the work in the Special Department for War Crimes. 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN 2009 
¶24 To effectively discuss advances in international criminal and 
humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2009, it is also 
necessary to mention developments during 2008. As noted earlier, 
this article is not a comprehensive review of developments, either in 
policy or jurisprudence, in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2008 or 
2009. Those with an interest in substantive international criminal 
and humanitarian law as it has been developed and applied in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina ought to review the verdicts and decisions of the 
First Instance panels and the Appellate panels in Section I and 
comment on how the State Court is influencing international 
criminal and humanitarian law and on how the State Court’s 
jurisprudence is developing.39 Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
                                                            
39 English translations of Section I decisions are available at www.sudbih.gov.ba. 
English translations of confirmed indictments of parties in war crimes cases are 
available at www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba and at www.sudbih.gov.ba. The future of 
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should be examined for how they address war crimes related issues 
and, more generally, for the process by which war crimes are dealt 
with at all levels of the criminal justice system, particularly whether 
war crimes investigations and prosecutions comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights.40  
¶25 Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the principal stewards of 
international criminal and humanitarian law and its role in 
advancing international criminal and humanitarian law will become 
even more important as the international ad hoc tribunals close. As a 
member of the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shares an interest and responsibility with the rest of the world in 
ensuring that it builds upon the atrocity crimes jurisprudence that 
                                                                                                                                        
English translation programs in the State Court and State Prosecutor’s Office is 
uncertain. If international financial support for the State Court or State 
Prosecutor’s Office ends or is mismanaged and translation and interpretation 
capacity is lost, it will become much harder for the international community to 
evaluate whether and how Bosnia and Herzegovina is contributing to the 
advancement of international criminal and humanitarian law. For this reason, the 
international community has an interest in preserving the language assistants and 
other translation and interpretation components now supporting the State 
Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court. 
 40 See, e.g., Appeal of Abduladhim Maktouf, Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Ap. No. 1785/06 (2007). The decisions of the Constitutional Court 
are available on its website: www.ccbh.ba. See also Husković, et al. v. The 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/02/12551, Decision on Admissibility 
and Merits, (Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003), i.e., a 
general discussion of the responsibilities of prosecuting authorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights insofar as the investigation of matters related to people missing in the war 
and the rights of their survivors are concerned; see also, The Advocacy Center 
TRIAL (ACT), Enforced disappearance of Edin Mahmuljin in June 1992, 
http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=1235&L=5 (July 22, 2010); The Advocacy 
Center TRIAL (ACT), Enforced disappearance of Nedžad Fazlić in June 1992, 
http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=1236&L=5 (July 22, 2010). Both 
submissions were filed in November 2009. Both cases were filed on behalf of 
survivors of the two men and both assert that the two are victims of violations of 
the procedural aspects of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 
(right to liberty and security) in conjunction with Article 1 (obligation to respect 
human rights) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights “due to the ongoing failure of BiH authorities to 
conduct an ex officio, prompt, impartial, independent and thorough investigation 
on [their] arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in order to establish 
[their] fate and whereabouts, as well as to identify those responsible for these 
crimes and to prosecute, judge and sanction them.”  
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has evolved in the international ad hoc tribunals, especially the 
ICTY.  
¶26 Compared to other countries in the region, the 
accomplishments in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2006, 
notwithstanding shortcomings, are remarkable and significant. As 
mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered the greatest losses in 
the 1992-1995 war and has the most work to do as a consequence. 
At the same time, it is the least economically developed state in the 
region, its resources are limited, and its political culture is not 
inclined to mount a sustained effort to do all it must to meet human 
rights standards and international expectations. Nonetheless, with 
international assistance, the prosecutors, judges, and investigators 
working on war crimes cases at the national level and in some of the 
Cantons and Districts have achieved more than any other nation in 
the region, both in numbers, quality, and credibility of cases 
undertaken and resolved. Prosecutors’ and judges’ knowledge and 
skill in applying international criminal and humanitarian law 
continues to develop with experience.  
¶27 The problems that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not, 
for the most part, at the working level. The legitimacy of what most 
prosecutors and judges are doing at the national level is 
unquestioned for now. The future, however, is uncertain. If the State 
Court, the Special Department for War Crimes, and the State 
Prosecutor’s Office are managed properly, if they receive the 
support they need from the national government, and if they get 
proper support and encouragement, war crimes prosecutions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to meet international 
standards for fairness, achieve respectable outcomes, and be the 
benchmark for war crimes prosecutions in the region.   
¶28 The State Prosecutor and the State Court have the 
opportunity to influence the development of international criminal 
and humanitarian law in a positive way and to demonstrate its 
increasing worth in international and domestic affairs. The national 
prosecutors and judges working on war crimes cases are maturing 
with the task. However, they will continue to need encouragement 
and assistance from the international community through the direct 
involvement of international prosecutors and judges and from 
scholarly interest in the international criminal and humanitarian law 
jurisprudence developing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
opportunity is too valuable to let slip by and too important for the 
international community to withdraw from too soon.  
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A. Human Rights Based Prosecution Standards 
¶29 One of the most significant developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2009 was the formal integration of human rights 
based standards into the mission of the Special Department for War 
Crimes and the policies implemented to help the Special Department 
achieve its mission. 
¶30 Article II of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
makes the ECHR an integral part of domestic law.41 The standards 
set by the ECHR apply to war crimes work at the national, Cantonal, 
and District levels. Under the ECHR’s Article 2 right to life 
provisions, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), Bosnia and Herzegovina has a duty to investigate deaths 
and cases of disappeared persons,42 whether they occur at the hands 
of state agents,43 private persons,44 or persons unknown.45 An 
investigation must be impartial, independent,46 and adequate “in the 
sense that it must be capable of leading to a decision as to the cause 
and circumstances of the death, as to whether any use of force was 
justified under Article 2 and as to the ‘identification and punishment 
of those responsible.’”47 Investigations must also be initiated 
promptly and conducted with reasonable expedition.48 They must be 
open to public scrutiny to ensure accountability and help maintain 
public confidence.49 Finally, the “next of kin” must be involved “in 
the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her 
legitimate interests,”50 which include the right to effective remedies, 
                                                            
41 See Dayton Accords, supra note 5, Annex 4, art. 2(2). 
42 See Cyprus v. Turkey 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 40. 
43 See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1995). 
44 See Menson v. United Kingdom 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 363. 
45 See Togcu v. Turkey App. No. 27602/95, Eur.Ct . H.R. (2005); Kaya v Turkey, 
No. 17747/03 Eur.Ct. H.R. (2006); Yasa v Turkey, 1998-VI Eur.Ct . H.R; 28 
EHRR 408. 
46 See Nachova v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2006). 
47 See DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & CARLA WARBRICK, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 50 (2009). See also Nachova v. Bulgaria, 
2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.; 42 EHRR 933 para.113 GC. 
48 Id. at 51. 
49 See McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 34 EHRR 52. 
50 See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 37 EHRR 52, para 
109; Ogur v. Turkey, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 31 EHRR 912; Gulec v. Turkey, 
1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R; 28 EHRR 121. 
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such as monetary compensation,51 guaranteed by Article 13 of the 
ECHR in cases involving death and disappearance.52 
¶31 Article 2’s general obligations impose a costly, 
overwhelming, and perhaps unrealistic burden on struggling 
criminal justice institutions in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina affected by the criminal acts 
committed during the war have a right, however, to expect that the 
state will discharge its Article 2 obligations. At the same time, the 
international community has created unrealistic expectations by 
proclaiming, for example, that everyone who committed a war crime 
will be prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to the maximum 
extent possible under the law. Practically speaking, these high 
expectations simply cannot be met. Not meeting them has the 
potential for resulting in public disappointment that may 
compromise the criminal justice system as a whole. The government 
and international community must match expectations to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s capabilities and build capacity to the extent resources 
permit to better enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet its post-
conflict obligations. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound by the 
ECHR, it must find ways to meet its obligations under the 
Convention, including obligations with regard to war crimes 
prosecutions, without promising too much or delivering too little.  
¶32 In early 2008, the Special Department for War Crimes 
developed a mission statement that made achieving the human rights 
standards set out in the ECHR one of its main objectives. To 
encourage compliance with the ECHR’s human rights standards, in 
June 2009, the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes gave 
Special Department prosecutors and staff members a memorandum 
that spelled out what was expected of them in the 2009 professional 
evaluation period. As a result, each prosecutor and staff member 
knew what the mission of the Special Department was and knew that 
meeting ECHR Article 2 and related human rights obligations was 
expected. They also knew that success in meeting that goal would be 
taken into consideration in their professional evaluations for the 
year. For the first time, prosecutors and staff at the national level 
would be graded on their human rights performance.53 
                                                            
51 See Kaya v. Turkey, supra note 45, para. 2108; Cobzaru v. Romania, App. no. 
48254/99 para 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). 
52 See Őneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.; 41 EHRR 325 para 148 GC. 
53 See David Schwendiman, Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Head, Special Department 
for War Crimes to Prosecutors, Special Department for War Crimes: Expectations, 
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¶33 The mission statement was also incorporated into the 2009 
proposed Internal Rules for the Special Department for War Crimes. 
The Special Department is required to have internal rules, which it 
was supposed to develop shortly after its creation in 2004. However, 
the Head of the Special Department did not prepare draft rules until 
late 2008. In addition to the mission statement, the proposed Internal 
Rules included draft policies and practice directions on charging, 
immunity, plea-bargaining, case selection and prioritization, and 
vulnerable victims, which were all aimed at giving those working in 
the Special Department the tools they needed to meet their human 
rights obligations under the ECHR. The draft rules also incorporated 
recommended strategic staffing plans designed to ensure that the 
Department would have the resources and assets needed to make 
that possible. 
¶34 In early 2009, the draft Internal Rules was circulated among 
the prosecutors and staff in the Special Department for War Crimes 
for review and comment. After drafting the rules and while they 
were still out for comment, the Head of the Special Department 
began using them to guide the Department’s work. The final version 
of the draft rules was given to the Chief Prosecutor and the new 
Head of the Special Department in December 2009.  
B. Investigating War Deaths and the Fate of Disappeared 
Persons 
¶35 There were significant developments during 2009 in policies 
and practices related to the investigation of war deaths and 
disappeared persons. On January 1, 2009, the Special Department 
for War Crimes assumed responsibility for managing the forensic 
aspects of locating, recovering, examining, identifying, and 
returning mortal remains from the war.54 The Special Department, 
together with the Missing Persons Institute, the International 
Commission on Mission Persons, the Cantonal and District 
prosecutors, and the State Court, developed protocols and 
                                                                                                                                        
Special Department for War Crimes Mission and Goals and Objectives for 2009 
(June 4, 2009)(Also accessible at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as 
Annex I). 
54 The authority for the Special Department and the State Court to take on full 
responsibility for the forensic work associated with the location, recovery, 
examination and identification of human remains from the war derives from 
articles. 103, 104, 105, 221, 222 of the Crimiminal Proocedure Code of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (as amended in 2003). 
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procedures for streamlining the process for obtaining authorization 
from the State Court for war crimes related excavations and 
exhumations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cantonal and 
District prosecutors remained responsible for ensuring that 
fieldwork was completed primarily because the State Prosecutor’s 
Office lacked the people and the appropriate resources for recovery 
work. However, the Special Department closely monitored 
fieldwork on graves sites.  
¶36 The Special Department, principally the Head of the 
Department supported by international and national staff, took full 
responsibility for obtaining court orders for exhumation and 
excavation, for inspecting and recommending improvements in the 
mortuaries that received recovered remains, and for maintaining the 
paper records of the completed fieldwork. The Special Department 
also assumed responsibility for protecting and preserving the 
forensic value of recovered remains and for ensuring that the 
humanitarian purposes behind the recovery, identification, and 
return of mortal remains from the war were complemented by the 
proper investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those 
criminally responsible for the deaths and disappearances, and made 
it possible for survivors to make meaningful property claims for the 
loss of a family member as a part of criminal proceedings.55  
¶37 Under the Criminal Procedure Code, during criminal 
proceedings, parties injured by criminal acts, including war crimes, 
can file a “claim under property law” for, among other things, 
“reimbursement of damages.”56 Prosecutors are obligated to notify 
potential claimants of their right to file an injured party claim in 
conjunction with pending criminal proceedings.57 In fact, during 
case investigations, prosecutors must “gather evidence regarding 
claims under property law relevant to the criminal offence.”58 The 
prosecutor or court is also required “to question the suspect or the 
accused in relation to the facts” relevant to injured party claims.59 
                                                            
55 See CRIM. PRO. CODE OF BOSN. AND HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 193–212. 
56 Id. art. 195(2). 
57 Id. art. 195(4). 
58 Id. art. 196(1), i.e., “The Prosecutor has a duty to gather evidence regarding 
claims under property law relevant to the criminal offense”; Id. art. 35(2)(g), i.e., 
“The Prosecutor shall have the following rights and duties . . . (g) to establish facts 
necessary for deciding on claims under property law in accordance with Article 
197 . . . .” 
59Id. art. 197(2). 
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Proper integration of humanitarian and forensic intervention in the 
recovery of human remains is essential to the proper discharge of 
this responsibility.  
¶38 In order to assist with the recovery and identification of 
mortal remains, the Special Department for War Crimes began what 
it called the Digital Archive Project in 2009 to recover and digitally 
capture crime scene, excavation, exhumation, forensic examination, 
and personal identification records held by various authorities 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without the Digital Archive 
Project, these records of the deaths and disappearances of thousands 
of victims of the war were in jeopardy of being lost through neglect. 
With the assistance of the Human Rights Violators Unit of U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, by the end of 2009 over 
450,000 pages of documents were located, recovered, and scanned 
into a searchable digital database and made available for use by the 
Special Department, the Missing Persons Institute, and others. Until 
they were included in the Digital Archive, many of the documents 
had never been reviewed for purposes of criminal investigation or 
prosecution because their existence was simply unknown to 
prosecutors. The project helped secure the forensic, humanitarian, 
and academic value of the records that were captured. Unless the 
project continues, hundreds of thousands of valuable documents that 
are not yet a part of the archive will be lost. Unfortunately, the 
Prosecutor’s Office has not kept up the Digital Archives Project 
since the end of 2009. The Special Department for War Crimes did 
not assign staff to the project for 2010 even though the proposed 
Internal Rules given to the new head of the Special Department 
included strategic staffing plans for supporting the Digital Archive.  
¶39 The head of the Special Department and the Chief Prosecutor 
have not yet demonstrated that they have plans to build upon the 
accomplishments of 2009 in locating, recovering, examining, and 
identifying mortal remains from the war. The human rights 
obligations that are implicated (e.g. the survivor’s right to an 
investigation into the fate of persons murdered or disappeared, the 
right to meaningful redress) in the failure to complete and maintain 
the Digital Archive and to continue the work related to the recovery 
of mortal remains are manifold and serious. The failure to complete 
the Digital Archive will also impact prosecutor’s legal obligations 
under the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the obligation 
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to develop evidence that will allow parties injured by war crimes to 
file civil claims. 60   
¶40 In 2009, prosecutors and staff in the Special Department for 
War Crimes’ Srebrenica team, worked to organize and coordinate 
the work of the several agencies and institutions, such as the 
Missing Persons Institute and the International Commission on 
Missing Persons, who are responsible for excavation and 
exhumation of graves in and around Srebrenica. As a result of this 
work, over 3,000 survivors and family members of victims of the 
Srebrenica killings were given notice of the their right to file injured 
party property claims61 in conjunction with the prosecution of 
Milorad Trbić.62 Injured parties made over 2,000 claims before the 
close of the main trial. On October 16, 2009, a First Instance verdict 
convicted Trbić of genocide and other crimes committed in 
connection with events in and around Srebrenica and sentenced him 
to thirty years in prison. As a result of the opportunity relatives of 
victims of the Srebrenica killings had to file claims in Trbic, the 
perception of and confidence in the Special Department and in the 
State Court increased considerably among the Srebrenica survivor 
and victim communities. The Special Department’s work in Trbić 
also created the expectation that injured parties in other cases will 
have similar opportunities to file property claims.63  
¶41 The First Instance verdict rendered in Trbić will not be final 
and binding until the appeals process is complete. The outcome of 
the claims process in the Trbić case specifically, but also more 
generally, is uncertain. There are still serious questions as to who 
will pay the claims, where the money will come from, and how 
much will actually be paid. However, it would have been impossible 
for survivors to even file claims in Trbić without the work of the 
Special Department in coordinating the efforts to identify the 
remains of the Srebrenica victims. Unless each victim in a criminal 
proceeding can be identified64 and brought into the courtroom as a 
                                                            
60 Id. arts. 193–212.  
61 See id. arts. 192-212. 
62 Trbić, supra note 3; Milorad TRBIĆ X-KR-07/386 Indictment 20.07.207 
(Amended Indictment, Apr. 3, 2009). 
63 See David Schwendiman, supra note 53. 
64 For reasons of confidentiality, to protect the sensitivity of the information 
regarding identification that was done by DNA analysis and comparison, and to 
prevent public disclosure of the identities of the dead in cases where families or 
survivors had not yet either been notified or had been notified but had refused to 
accept identification, only those people who had previously been notified and 
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name and not just a number, survivors will not be able to bring 
injured party claims.  
¶42 The accomplishments of the Srebrenica team in Trbić and 
other cases stemming from the events in Srebrenica in identifying 
remains were the foundation upon which Special Department built 
its 2009 general policy regarding excavation and exhumation. In 
fact, the efforts in Trbić paved the way for general policies that were 
implemented and made part of the Special Department’s mission 
statement. Also, the 2009 proposed Internal Rules, which were 
given to the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes and the 
Chief Prosecutor in December 2009, included a provision for the 
creation of a Forensic Section within the Special Department to 
continue work such as what was done in Srebrenica.65 The Head of 
the Special Department and the Chief Prosecutor have yet to address 
the serious questions of whether these policies will continue in the 
future or whether the Special Department will adopt the proposed 
Internal Rules. Failure to continue these policies will have serious 
consequences in terms of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s human rights 
obligations and public perception and confidence in the Special 
Department.  
C. Meaningful and Reasonably Quick Investigations, 
Prosecution Decisions, and Prosecutions 
¶43 As already noted, under Article 2 of the ECHR, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must make reasonable efforts to conduct impartial and 
independent investigations into deaths and disappearances.66 
Investigations are adequate if they establish the cause and 
circumstance of death and whether any use of force was justified, 
and if they result in sufficient information to permit the 
                                                                                                                                        
accepted the identification of their loved ones were sent notice of their right to file 
a claim. Great care was taken in building the databases used to manage the 
identities of the dead and the notification of family members in connection with 
the criminal proceedings against Trbić to ensure that all personal data collection, 
management, and privacy requirements were met. No victim was identified by 
name to the State Court whose relatives had not been notified and consented to the 
inclusion of the name in the submissions made to the Court. An amended 
indictment was filed at the close of the case identifying 3,737 victims by name. 
See Milorad TRBIĆ (X-KR-07/386), Amended Indictment, 04.03.2009. 
65 See Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz., 
Internal Rules (Proposed) Forensic Section (Dec. 9, 2009) (Also accessible at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex II). 
66 See Nachova, supra note 46. 
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“identification and punishment of those responsible.”67 
Investigations must also be initiated promptly and conducted with 
reasonable expedition.68 These obligations apply to war crimes 
investigations and prosecutions at all levels, and place an 
overwhelming and costly burden on Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
¶44 What is “reasonable” in terms of these obligations is relative, 
and, of course, influenced by the resources the state can use to 
investigate and prosecute in such cases and the complexity of much 
of what went on during the conflict that resulted in the violent 
deaths of around 100,000 people.69 Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
bound, nonetheless, to make genuine efforts to meet these 
obligations, but it has had trouble doing so in the past.70 In 2008, it 
was clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have even greater 
trouble meeting its obligations in the future unless a more organized 
way of managing the war crimes workload was developed. 
¶45 In early 2009, the Special Department for War Crimes 
implemented a new policy aimed at reforming war crimes case 
selection and prioritization.71 The new policy adopted a 
                                                            
67 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 50; See also Nachova, supra note 46. 
68 Id. at 51. 
69 Letter from Ewa Tabeau, Demographer, ICTY/OTP (Sept. 10, 2008); see also 
BOSNIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD, supra note 6. 
70 See, e.g., Husković, supra note 40 (a general discussion of the responsibilities 
of prosecuting authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the relevant 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights insofar as the 
investigation of matters related to people missing in the war and the rights of their 
survivors are concerned).; see also, Advocacy Center TRIAL (ACT), supra note 
40 (both submissions were filed in November 2009 on behalf of survivors of the 
two men and both assert that the two are victims of violations of the procedural 
aspects of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty and 
security) in conjunction with Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights) and 
Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR “due to the ongoing failure 
of BiH authorities to conduct an ex officio, prompt, impartial, independent and 
thorough investigation on [their] arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in 
order to establish [their] fate and whereabouts, as well as to identify those 
responsible for these crimes and to prosecute, judge and sanction them.”) 
71Beginning as early as late 2006, then Chief Prosecutor of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Marinko Jurčević, called for a comprehensive look at the conflict 
from a criminal perspective, urging a more programmatic approach to selecting 
cases for investigation and prosecution. Jurčević’s call eventually led to the work 
of Dr. Marko Prelec, who was then the Head of the Research and Analysis Section 
in the Special Department for War Crimes, in producing the comprehensive 
survey of war crimes related situations and events. Chief Prosecutor Jurčević left 
the position in February 2008 before he could see the results of his call.  
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SITUATION-EVENT-ACT-ACTOR or “SEAA” approach, which 
enabled the Special Department to better organize itself to meet 
Article 2 investigation obligations. SEAA encourages prosecutors to 
start investigations by looking broadly at situations that occurred 
during the Bosnian War and then look more narrowly at the events 
that took place within a situation to identify criminal acts and actors. 
This approach helps prosecutors and managers better understand the 
nature of the conflict from a criminal law perspective and make 
more informed selections of matters to investigate and possibly 
prosecute.72 Prior to implementing SEAA, prosecutors would focus 
their investigative and prosecution efforts on individual complaint 
files that had been generated since the beginning of the war. 
Isolating their efforts in this fashion proved to be a wasteful and 
ineffective way of dealing with the war crimes workload.  
¶46 An essential tool necessary for the implementation of the 
new case selection policy was a comprehensive survey of the 
conflict, which was completed by Dr. Marko Prelec in 2008. The 
survey was a thorough historical analysis of, among other things, 
ICTY indictments, judgments, and available investigative files; 
materials collected from military and other archives in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; investigative files held by the Prosecutors Office of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; information provided by witnesses and 
informants during Special Department investigations; and 
information provided by civil society, including information 
provided by the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo. 
This survey of materials resulted in a catalog of information 
organized by where and when conduct that was most likely to have 
violated international criminal and humanitarian law occurred 
during the Bosnian War.73  
                                                            
72 See David Schwendiman, “Addressing the Nation’s War Crimes Predicament: 
A Status Report – Special Department for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina” at the 5th Conference of Chief Prosecutors of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Trebinje (October 1, 2009); see also Special Dep’t for War Crimes, 
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz., Prosecution Guidelines, 5. Case 
Selesction and Prioritization (February 9, 2009) (Also accessible at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex III). 
73 DR. MARKO PRELEC, PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF BOSN. AND HERZ., A CRIME-
CENTERED APPROACH TO WAR CRIME CASE SELECTION IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA (June 2008). 
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¶47 The survey made it possible for prosecutors to use neutral 
criteria, which are written into Practice Direction No. 5,74 together 
with a “Strategic Inventory”75 of existing criminal complaint files 
and other files held by the State Prosecutor’s Office and some of the 
Cantonal and District prosecutors to begin to plan and carry out 
investigations and prosecutions. These investigations and 
prosecutions enabled multiple people to be investigated and indicted 
together and resulted in more significant, but fewer charges in each 
indictment. As a result of the survey and inventory, investigations 
had the potential to create a more complete and comprehensible 
record of events, and prosecutions promised to save witnesses from 
having to repeatedly give the same testimony. The survey began to 
help eliminate unnecessary duplication of investigations, which was 
wasting resources and costing the Special Department for War 
Crimes credibility with witnesses, survivors, and investigators.  
¶48 The survey, the criteria, and the inventory were improved 
upon in 2008 and 2009 and were in use at the end of 2009.76 The 
Norwegian government supported work on the comprehensive 
survey and the Strategic Inventory, both of which are unique in 
atrocity litigation. At the end of 2009 it was clear that more work 
was required to capture all of the information that was needed to 
                                                            
74 Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 5. Case Selection and 
Prioritization, supra note 72. Prosecutors in the Special Department for War 
Crimes began using Practice Direction 5 to help them identify and select cases for 
investigation and prosecution in early 2009. 
75 The Strategic Inventory is an exercise carried out by analysts working in the 
Research and Analysis Section of the Special Department for War Crimes. The 
project is sponsored and supported by the Norwegian government. A database 
created by Johnathan McCaskill, an International Legal Officer working in the 
office of the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes, is used to manage 
the results of the exercise. It was being populated through the end of 2009 with 
information and data drawn by the analysts primarily from files held by 
prosecutors in the Special Department that were received from the ICTY at the 
end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. Well over 4000 such files were returned to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Rules of the Road Unit at the ICTY closed at 
the end of 2004. The newly created Special Department for War Crimes in the 
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina assumed the responsibility for 
vetting future cases for possible investigation and prosecution.  
76 An improved third version of the comprehensive survey of the conflict was 
completed in December 2009. SPECIAL DEP’T FOR WAR CRIMES, SURVEY OF WAR 
CRIME RELATED SITUATIONS AND EVENTS: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1992 TO 
1995 (Version No. 3) (Dec. 4, 2009). Version No. 3 was translated and left with 
the new Head of the Special Department for War Crimes and the Chief Prosecutor 
in December 2009. 
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make the Strategic Inventory fully useful and to establish a system 
to maintain the inventory once the initial entries were completed. In 
2009, the Norwegian government committed to help the 
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue this work 
through 2010.  
¶49 The comprehensive survey and the inventory also helped the 
Special Department assist a number of foreign prosecution and 
investigation services, including the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Human Rights 
Violators Unit, Norwegian prosecutors, and Danish prosecutors, in 
conducting their own investigations to identify émigrés from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina who may be responsible for war crimes committed 
during the war.  In early 2008, the Special Department initiated open 
cooperation policies with foreign investigators and prosecutors 
working on matters of common interest.77 The comprehensive 
survey was used to help coordinate what foreign jurisdictions were 
doing so that their investigations targeted people for deportations 
and removal to Bosnia and Herzegovina who were of special interest 
to the Special Department. Among other things, this kind of 
collaboration helped prevent surprise deportations or removals to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that might have compromised the Special 
Department’s control over its caseload. This mutually beneficial 
arrangement gave the Special Department more control over what it 
could anticipate while also giving considerable guidance to foreign 
jurisdictions’ investigations. The policy promised to contribute 
significantly to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to meet its Article 
2 right to life obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. These policies have not been continued into 2010. 
¶50 Managing discretion in the investigation and charging of war 
crimes was also the subject of Practice Direction No. 1, a policy 
governing charging that was implemented in the Special Department 
                                                            
77 Special Department’s open cooperation policies did not extend to formal 
cooperation on the same scale with Croatia or Serbia for a number of political 
reasons and because of a fundamental lack of mutual trust in the region. The 
reasons ranged from varying legal interpretations of state responsibilities under 
the European Convention on Human Rights and obligations under European 
conventions on extradition to differing understandings of each others’ 
responsibilities in terms of investigating and prosecuting war crimes under their 
national law. On the working level, however, prosecutors in the Special 
Department commonly cooperated and assisted their counterparts in Croatia and 
Serbia and their counterparts in Croatia and Serbia assisted Special Department 
prosecutors on occasion.  
2010] D A V I D  S C H W E N D I M A N 
 
295
in 2008 and used by Special Department prosecutors for most of 
2009.78 The intent of the policy was, in part, to reduce the number of 
counts charged in each war crimes case and to increase the number 
of accused included in each prosecution. This was to be done while 
also keeping in mind the right of victims to make property claims. 
The goal of the policy was for cases to be managed more efficiently 
by requiring less court time, fewer witnesses, and less evidence for 
the courts to reconcile in reaching and writing their verdicts. The 
policy also set standards for prosecutors to use when deciding 
whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation and 
propose an indictment. It defined and gave substance to vague terms 
in the Criminal Procedure Code such as “grounds for suspicion”79 
and “grounded suspicion,”80 which were susceptible to inconsistent 
application. The intent of the policy was to give prosecutors greater 
confidence in their ability to make well reasoned, more consistent, 
and quicker prosecution decisions.  
¶51 Practice Direction No. 1 also encouraged prosecutors to 
consider terminating investigations when it was apparent, given the 
standard that was written into the policy, that they would not result 
in prosecutable cases. In the political environment in which war 
crimes prosecutors must work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, choosing 
to terminate an investigation can be one of the most difficult 
decisions a prosecutor will ever have to make. The Special 
Department established a review process to ensure that such 
decisions were made based on the best available information and the 
most well informed application of the law. In 2009, a number of 
matters, including some high profile investigations, were terminated 
short of prosecution after review by the Head of the Special 
Department. These decisions saved valuable resources, which were 
put to better use investigating and prosecuting more promising 
matters.  
¶52 The policy established in Practice Direction No. 1 results in 
the use of less court time, fewer witnesses, and less evidence and 
ensures that cases that are not viable will not be brought. It makes it 
possible for the Special Department to do more with its limited 
                                                            
78 Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz., 
Prosecution Guidelines, 1. Charging (Jan. 13, 2009) (Also accessible at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex IV).  
79 CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 216(1) (the standard for 
initiating an investigation).  
80 Id. art. 226(1) (the standard for proposing an indictment). 
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resources and time. Effective use of Practice Direction No. 1 will 
enable the Special Department to better meet its obligations to 
conduct expeditious investigations and prosecutions. Practice 
Direction No. 1 was given to the Chief Prosecutor and the Head of 
the Special Department in December 2009. Without this policy or 
something very similar, it will be difficult for the Special 
Department for War Crimes to manage its charging discretion in a 
way that will help it meet its right to life obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
D. Pleas and Plea Bargaining 
¶53 One of the most significant developments in 2008 and 2009 
was the successful introduction at the national level of a practice of 
encouraging pleas of guilty rather than going to trial. Beginning in 
2008, in exchange for recommendations from the prosecution to the 
court for limited sentences, accused were required to cooperate in 
current or future investigations and prosecutions as well as make 
verifiable proffers of information and evidence, particularly 
information and evidence regarding the location of mortal remains.  
¶54 The practice of plea-bargaining was pioneered in 2008 with 
pleas from Dušan Fuštar81 and Paško Ljubičić.82 A number of 
similar pleas were negotiated in 2009.83 In 2008, a policy was 
developed and implemented to provide guidance, ensure 
consistency, and limit prosecutors’ ability to negotiate with an 
accused in order to properly manage the use of pleas. The policy 
also set up a review process that ensured that the Special 
Department maintained credibility with the defense and the court 
and was consistent in the way it used pleas.84 Under the policy, the 
Head of the Special Department for War Crimes reviewed and 
signed off on all pleas before they were presented to the State Court 
for acceptance. Before a prosecutor could even enter into plea 
negotiations, the Head of the Department had to approve. An 
important feature of the plea policy was that an agreement could not 
recommend a sentence below the statutory minimum for the crime 
                                                            
81 Fuštar, supra note 3. 
82 Ljubičić, supra note 3. 
83 See, e.g., Ivanković, supra note 3. 
84 Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz., 
Prosecution Guidelines, 2. Pleas and Plea Bargaining (Jan. 11, 2008) (Also 
accessible at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex V).  
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to which the accused was charged without express authority from 
the Head of the Special Department.  
¶55 Pleas and plea-bargaining in war crimes cases in 2008 and 
2009 were met with mixed reactions from the public.85 Plea deals in 
war crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina are problematic 
because of the gravity of the crimes involved, the affect on survivors 
and victims, and because of the heightened political attention war 
crimes cases attract in the region. However, they are legally 
acceptable and, in most cases, practically desirable. The policy 
implemented in 2008 to manage plea negotiations included features 
that were intended to help reduce public criticism and preserve the 
credibility and utility of the plea-bargaining. Among the most 
important of these features was the requirement that prosecutors 
meet with victims and survivors to explain a plea, answer why it was 
reasonable under the circumstances, and explain why it should be 
advanced.  
¶56 The public reacted with hostility to the prosecution’s first 
proposal regarding the sentence in the Damir Ivanković case that 
was resolved in 2009. 86 Information Ivanković gave prosecutors as 
part of plea negotiations resulted in the discovery and recovery of 
the remains of approximately sixty men. The result was generally 
well received by those who wanted to know what happened to the 
men whose remains were found. At the same time, representatives 
of some of the victims publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the 
plea. Their concern was with the prosecution’s recommendation 
regarding sentence and is attributable to the prosecutor’s failure to 
adequately explain the plea and the fact that the original 
recommended sentence was less than the statutory minimum 
sentence for the offense with which the accused was charged. Even 
after the recommended sentence was increased to a term greater than 
the statutory minimum, the negative perception of the plea was 
never fully overcome. Despite what prosecutors regarded as a 
reasonably good outcome, the plea in Ivanković did not contribute to 
the credibility of the Special Department or the legitimacy of plea-
bargaining as much as it might have if the plea bargaining policy 
that was in force had been followed.  
¶57 As the Ivanković case illustrates, the practice of plea-
bargaining is in its infancy in war crimes cases at the national level 
                                                            
85 See, e,g., Merima Husejnović, Victims dissatisfied with Bosnian Court’s 
decisions, BIRN JUSTICE REPORT, May 30, 2008. 
86 Ivanković, supra note 3. 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even if the practice becomes better 
accepted, it is not likely to significantly reduce the number of cases 
tried since most accused are unwilling to plead guilty and comply 
with plea conditions such as providing information and evidence 
regarding the crime, including information about the location of 
mortal remains. In addition, the prosecutor must be willing to 
consider a plea and be willing to inform the affected parties honestly 
about the plea and give them an opportunity to voice their reactions 
and concerns. Finally, the court must decide whether to accept the 
plea as being in the best interests of the accused and the affected 
public. Bringing all of this together will be difficult in most cases. 
¶58 Presently, for a variety of reasons, including the social and 
political pressure an accused is likely to feel from his constituent 
people against admitting that he committed a war crime and lack of 
experience with pleas on the defense side of the equation, pleas are 
not routinely sought by accused or their counsel. When they do 
propose a plea, accused and their counsel often ask for ridiculously 
unreasonable terms such as sentences generally well below the 
statutory minimum. It is also difficult sometimes for prosecutors in 
war crimes cases to justify a plea deal if there is sufficient proof to 
convict the accused at trial and if there is limited benefit beyond 
saving the court and the prosecutor time and resources. Nonetheless, 
plea-bargaining is a useful tool that saves valuable resources even in 
war crimes cases. Plea-bargaining has significant value when an 
accused is willing to admit responsibility and, as a condition of the 
plea, make a profession of contrition to the victims and survivors of 
his or her crimes. As happened in the Ivanković case, a plea can 
result in the accused leading the prosecution to hitherto 
undiscovered mortal remains, which can have considerable 
humanitarian and forensic value. Also, an admission of guilt can 
provide a somewhat more reliable and, perhaps more acceptable 
factual record than a trial in which even well established facts are 
often disputed for political reasons well after conviction.  
¶59 As with many of the developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2008 and 2009, the policies implemented to manage 
a prosecutor’s discretion in plea-bargaining, including the written 
policies that were promulgated by the Head of the Special 
Department in 2009, are at risk. If the new Head of the Special 
Department or the Chief Prosecutor do not continue to enforce the 
plea and plea bargaining policies that were implemented in 2008 and 
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2009, the practice of plea-bargaining will quickly lose its legitimacy 
and its utility.  
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
¶60 The aim of the Atrocity Crimes Litigation Year-in-Review 
(2009) Conference was to examine and analyze the development of 
international criminal and humanitarian law in 2009. While this 
article is not a comprehensive review of all of the significant 
developments in war crimes prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2008 or 2009, it does highlight some of the more 
important developments and trends, particularly those developments 
that have potential for affecting important policies and the progress 
of international criminal and humanitarian law. The intent of this 
article was not to condemn, but to describe, comment, and warn so 
that the international community and those in control of the 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are responsible for 
addressing the nation’s war crimes can more easily discharge their 
human rights obligations and the duty they owe to the development 
of international criminal and humanitarian law.  
¶61 The international community is so knitted together when it 
comes to international criminal and humanitarian law and practice 
that what is being done in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be 
ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. In less than four years, the State 
Court has issued First Instance verdicts in over sixty cases and 
almost forty of those cases have final and binding verdicts. Almost 
all of them are translated and available for study, comment, and 
criticism. Since most of the decisions—good or bad, right or 
wrong—are likely to inform practice elsewhere, they require 
scrutiny. 
¶62 In the new adversary system introduced in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the prosecutor enjoys the responsibility for initiating 
war crimes investigations and prosecuting worthy cases. The 
prosecutor drives the system. This article introduces practices and 
policies that were developed and introduced in 2007, 2008, and 
2009 to help prosecutors and supervisors in the Special Department 
meet the daunting task of managing their immense workload. These 
policies systematized the use of prosecutorial discretion in order to 
build credibility, lower opportunity costs, and ensure that the Special 
Department complied with human rights standards.  
¶63 War crimes work in Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a critical 
juncture. Policies and practices that were effective in 2009 are in 
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jeopardy of being abandoned. The international community’s urge to 
declare an early victory when it comes to war crimes committed 
during the Bosnian War is growing and encouraged by political 
considerations that have little to do with the orderly development of 
the tools needed to fix accountability for crimes committed during 
the war. These include an understandable desire to end the oversight 
of the High Representative and deliver more responsibility for 
governance to national authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
However, the international community, of which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a part, cannot afford to allow the rich legacy of the 
ICTY and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s potential for adding to and 
improving on that legacy to go to waste for lack of attention, vision, 
or commitment. 
¶64 The international community must take its share of the blame 
for the situation in which Bosnia and Herzegovina now finds itself. 
However, the national government and the heads of the State 
Prosecutor and the State Court have a greater responsibility to 
continue the policies and improvements that the international 
community helped create within the Special Department for War 
Crimes and in Section I of the Court. Those working in the Special 
Department on War Crimes and the State Court must supply the 
vision and support for what Bosnia and Herzegovina must do to 
meet national and international expectations for war crimes 
investigations and prosecutions stemming from the war that befell 
the nation. The far ranging consequences of a failure to do this 
properly are not acceptable.  
¶65 The High Representative, the ICTY, and the international 
community as a whole share with Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
stewardship of international criminal and humanitarian law and the 
legal legacy of the ICTY. They bear considerable responsibility for 
ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina meets those expectations and 
properly discharges that stewardship in the process. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must accept international involvement in war crimes 
investigations and prosecutions to the extent it is necessary to 
guarantee this happens. Finally, scholars must do their part to supply 
both the attention and the vision that can help guide those in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina who genuinely understand their roles and the 
significance of what they are doing and who are committed to 
making good on the potential that exists for turning the nightmare of 
the war into a legal legacy that can be the envy of the world. 
